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THE THIRD LEG OF THE ANTITRUST STOOL: WHAT THE
BUSINESS SCHOOLS HAVE TO OFFER TO ANTITRUST
ALBERT

A.

FOER*

For the past year, the American Antitrust Institute has been
conducting an investigation of the relationship, actual and potential, between the nation's business schools and antitrust policy. At
this conference, we are presenting and discussing our findings.'
Our working hypothesis implicitly consisted of the following elements: (1) antitrust is largely about how business firms behave in
their rivalrous inter-relations; (2) firms behave on the basis of decisions made by individual managers and directors; (3) business
schools teach future managers and directors about the nature and
norms of competition; (4) what is thought and what is taught in the
business schools are likely to affect how firms actually compete; and
(5) this information may confirm, supplement, or contradict the
ways in which antitrust analysis is currently handled.
One of the first things we learned is that competition tends to
be discussed by three surprisingly separate faculty groups within
business schools: the marketing faculty, the strategic management
faculty, and the economics faculty. Much less frequently, it is also
discussed within the context of business ethics courses, in terms of
the firm's obligations to various stakeholders, including, very occasionally, their competitors. In order to develop information to test
our hypothesis, we agreed upon the following assignments. Gregory
Gundlach, a marketing professor at Notre Dame, would focus on
marketing. 2 Norman Hawker, a strategic management professor at
* Foer is President of the American Antitrust Institute, http://www.antitrustinstitute.org. HisJ.D. is from the University of Chicago. He has practiced law in Washington, D.C., was a senior executive of the Federal Trade Commission, and served as CEO
of a chain of retail stores. He taught antitrust courses as an adjunct professor in business programs at Johns Hopkins and George Washington universities.
1. On May 24, 2002, we presented early drafts of our papers at a multidisciplinary research workshop sponsored by the Mendoza Business School at the University of
Notre Dame. Available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/184.cfm.
2. PAUL N. BLOOM & GREGORY T. GUNDLACH, Marketing and Modern Antitrust
Thought, in HANDBOOK OF MARKETING AND SOCIETY (2001); See also Gregory T. Gund-
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Western Michigan, would focus on strategic management.3 Both
Professor Gundlach and Professor Hawker have law degrees and
are experts in antitrust law, although teaching in business schools.
We asked Lawrence White, an economist who has long taught at
the Stern School at NYU, to focus on what economists teach in the
business schools. 4 To help us put all this into additional context, we
asked Spencer Weber Waller of the Loyola Chicago Law School,
who last year published an important article on the interrelationship between law, economics, and business 5 , to focus on how business theory can be applied to antitrust litigation. And we invited
Rudolph Peritz of the New York Law School, a scholar of the intellectual history of antitrust, 6 to think about how law, economics, and
business theory might be better integrated.
This paper will be explanatory and exploratory. I will explain
why I think the business schools should play a larger role in antitrust analysis and how antitrust might benefit. I will also explore (or
more precisely, begin to explore) several areas that seem fertile for
development by those in either base camp - antitrust or business
school-who share this sense.
Metaphorically, antitrust is something of a handicapped threelegged stool that has been resting precariously on only two functioning legs. The first two legs, of course, are the law school and the
economics department. The third missing leg is the business
school. Or to put it differently, antitrust analysis pays substantial
attention to the rules and norms that are found in law. It also pays a
great deal of attention to the market interplay of supply and demand that captures the heart of economists, especially neoclassical
lach & Joan M. Phillips, Contributions and Challenges of Marketing to Antitrust, 47 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 51 (2003).
3. Norman Hawker, Antitrust Insights From Strategic Management, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REv. 67 (2003).
4. See Lawrence J. White, Microeconomics and Antitrust in MBA Programs: What's
Thought, VVhat's Taught, 47 N.Y.L. ScH L. REv. 87 (2003).
5. See Spencer Weber Waller, The Language ofLaw and the Language of Business, 52
CWRL. REV. 283 (2001); Spencer Weber Waller, The Use of Business Theory in Antitrust
Litigation, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 119 (2003).
6. See RUDOLPHJ.R. PERITZ, COMPETIrION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY, RHETORIC,
LAW (rev. ed. 2000). GUndlach, Hawker, and Peritz are Fellows of the American Antitrust Institute; Waller and 'White are members of the AAI Advisory Board. See also, Rudolph J. R. Peritz, Toward a Dynamic Antitrust Analysis of Strategic Market Behavior, 47
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 101 (2003).
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economists. What is generally missing, however, is a focus on the
firm itself and (it follows) the individual decision makers within the
firm. This seems odd because it is the firm that must try to conform
to norms and the firm that must operate within the framework of
supply and demand. 7 If what is thought in the business schools is
inconsistent with how antitrust analysis proceeds in the enforcement agencies, there is a disconnect that begs to be explained and
evaluated. Our investigation reveals that there are some important
differences.
This observation could lead to two different types of conclusions. One set would relate to changes that might be desirable in
the administration of the antitrust laws. The other would relate to
changes that might be desirable in the business schools. As to the
latter, we know that the thrust of the business curriculum is to teach
how firms can accrue sustainable competitive advantage. This often
amounts to what we in antitrust call market power. The question
arises whether the future leaders of our corporations are sufficiently exposed to the ideas of antitrust in their curriculum, that is,
the limitations that the law imposes on the accrual of market power.
In general, we found that very few business schools offer courses on
antitrust and these courses, when offered, reach only a small proportion of students. Most schools offer a course in business law that
is taken by a higher proportion of students, but usually includes
only the most general introduction to antitrust. 8 To the extent that
industrial organization economics is taught in the business schools,
it seems to be the same economics that is taught in graduate economics departments, albeit with somewhat more attention to appli7. As noted by David T. Scheffman, a former teacher at the Vanderbilt business
school and currently the Director of the FTC's Bureau of Economics, there is a "weakness at the core of economics-we do not have a good model of the firm that explains
much of the reality that we observe. This has been a very long-standing deficiency in
economics, upon which many have commented over the years. I believe that this deficiency can be remedied by bringing into economics much of the reality of actual firms
and tapping what is useful in the disciplines of marketing, accounting, and business
strategy." David T. Scheffman, Antitrust, Economics, and "Reality", in THE EcONOMICS OF
THE ANTITRUST PROCEss 240 (Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit, eds., 1996).

8. Some business schools integrate law, including antitrust, into an MBA program. See e.g., Richard P. Mandel et al., IntegratingLaw Into an IntegratedMBA Program:
The Experience of the E W. Olin Graduate School of Business at Babson College, 14 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 17, 22-23 (1996).
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cations. However, relatively few business students are exposed to
this.
These observations lead to a fairly obvious recommendation: a
joint committee of antitrust law professors, business school economists, marketing professors, strategic management experts, and
teachers of business ethics should be convened for the purpose of
proposing business school curriculum reforms that will provide increased understanding of the principles and purposes of antitrust
to our future business leaders. In the expected counter-revolution
unleashed by the scandals at Enron, Global Crossing, Arthur Andersen, et al., any restructuring of business school curricula should not
leave out instilling greater respect for the traditions of antitrust.
In the next section of this paper, I will be noting the recent
attention that business school learning has received within the antitrust community, as the writings of Michael Porter have gained increasing currency. This is a good starting point because it highlights
the potential influence of the business schools on major directional
issues, while at the same time indicating that changes can only
come if the three legs of the stool are operating in a mutually reinforcing manner.
ON THE USES OF MICHAEL PORTER

Under the presidency of Ky Ewing, the American Bar Association's Section of Antitrust Law in 2000-2001 engaged in a reexamination of some of the assumptions underlying antitrust policy. As
Ewing wrote, "It would be arrogant folly for us to believe that our
current perspectives are the ultimate truth... [W]e need regularly
to re-examine our basic models, perspectives, and tools of analysis... "9Ewing set up what he called the Task Force on Fundamental
Theory for the stated purpose of "examining the thesis that concentration tells us something predictive about future marketplace behavior."'' The Task Force was to be chaired by James Loftis, III,
who like many of the members appointed to the Task Force, is reputed to be of a markedly laissez faire bent. Despite the fact that
three members of the AAI Advisory Board (Donald Baker, Jonathan
9.
(2001).
10.

Ky P. Ewing, Jr., Introduction:Perspectives on Competition, 69 ANTITRUST L. J. 349
Ky P. Ewing, Jr., From the Section Chair, 15 ANTITRUST 2 (Fall, 2000).
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Baker, and Steven Salop) were on the Task Force, many of us in the
AAI were concerned, perhaps with a touch of paranoia, that the
Task Force on Fundamental Theory was intended to undercut one
of the basic presumptions that helps structure antitrust policy, the
idea that high levels of concentration are dangerous.
Two reasons were put forward tojustify the mission of the Task
Force. First, there exists a body of economic literature that challenges the older literature positing a relationship between concentration and economic harm. Perhaps it is time to reconsider the
role of concentration. Second, courts have become much less willing to accept expert testimony that is not based on a scientific consensus. An attorney on the Task Force, Charles Weller, has argued
that the Daubert line of Supreme Court Cases makes the current
merger guidelines, with their presumptions about concentration, of
dubious enforceability in court." The role of the Task Force,
clearly, could be to initiate a radical redirection of antitrust. If the
standing of the structural presumption were undermined, it might
be replaced by a "kitchen sink" rule of reason approach that could
enhance the ease with which large businesses could grow substantially larger through mergers and joint ventures. This would indeed
constitute a fundamental change.
Our concerns grew as reports emerged that the Task Force was
being urged by Weller to adopt the teachings of Harvard business
school professor, Michael E. Porter, as an outright substitute for
current modes of analysis. Porter has long been considered the
dean of strategic management professors and his teachings have
found their way into virtually every textbook studied in business
school strategy courses. According to Weller's version of Porter,
ideas relating to industry concentration should be replaced by
Porter's "five forces" and "diamond analysis of the business environment". This substitution was touted as eliminating the need for defining relevant antitrust markets or calculating market shares-the
key concepts in modem merger analysis.

11.
Charles D. Weller, An Evolution of Merger-iV Analysis: The Productivity Paradigm
as a Positive Antitrust Policy for Competitiveness and Prosperity,in REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE
ON FUNDAMENTAL THEORY 277 (2001) (ABA Section of Antitrust Law, July 2001).

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

Porter himself met with a roundtable of participants invited by
the Task Force on January 11, 2000.12 Many questions were raised
about how Porter's insights could be applied to antitrust enforcement, and several of the participants wrote critical papers."' Weller
was eventually given the opportunity to expand on his rendition of
Porter during a plenary session of the Antitrust Section of the
A.B.A. in the spring of 2001. His presentation was so roundly and
cogently criticized by economist Lawrence Summers, the President
of Harvard University, that there seemed to be a real possibility that
Porter's potential usefulness to antitrust would be thoroughly dismissed at this point.
Fortunately, it was not. The Report of the Task Force on Fundamental Theory was published in July, 2001, compiling a variety of
papers and the roundtable discussion, but without any effort at
drawing a conclusion or offering recommendations. Most importantly, the Report contains the paper prepared by Michael Porter,
refined in light of the discussions and further thought. Titled
"Competition and Antitrust: Towards a Productivity-Based Approach to Evaluating Mergers and Joint Ventures," it is a brilliant
and provocative document.
Bringing this brief history to its current posture, the Conference Board in March 2002, invited Porter to speak at its annual
antitrust conference. According to reports, Porter advocated a
more limited version of his paper, calling on regulators to emphasize whether a merger harms innovation or productivity rather than
whether the merger results in higher prices.' 4 A genuine debate
1
seems to be brewing.

5

Michael Porter comes out of an industrial organization economics background, reoriented to business scholarship and client
consulting. Basically, Porter's career was built upon the trick of
turning standard industrial organization economics inside out. For
12.

Excerpts from the transcript are in ABA Section of Antitrust Law, REPORT OF
385-474 (2001).
These are collected in REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON FUNDAMENTAL THEORY

THE TASK FORCE ON FUNDAMENTAL THEORY

13.

(2001).
14. Jaret Sieberg, Regulators PonderShift in Antitrust Thinking (Mar. 11, 2002), available at http://www.TheDeal.com.
15. FTC Commissioner Thomas B. Leary is quoted by Sieberg : "Michael Porter
has a lot to say that we need to pay attention to... It is time we start thinking about it
and talking about it. You will hear this more and more." Id.
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example, if industrial organization economics taught that entry barriers keep out competition, Porter taught that entry barriers are
what a firm should try to utilize to maximize its competitive advantage, and he elaborated strategies for doing this. 16
Most of Porter's work over the years has focused on competitive strategy, but he has occasionally applied his insights to antitrust
analysis. In an FTC seminar back in 1981, for example, Porter
called on antitrust enforcers to make more use of the industry history, as practiced in the business schools, and to pay increased attention to strategic interactions. 1 7 He also urged that antitrust
policy should vary according to the life cycle posture of the industry. I believe history will report that his work importantly stimulated
many of the people associated with the post-Chicago movement,
but had little if any impact on the Chicago School itself.
In his ABA essay, Porter states that his experience as a consultant and writer has convinced him that open competition, stimulated by strict antitrust enforcement, is essential not only to
national prosperity, but to the health of companies themselves.' 8
Yet, he says, antitrust now seems to be drifting and needs to be rein-

vigorated. He points the way to a new vision of antitrust based on
the proposition that productivity growth should be the basic goal.
Productivity growth is central, he argues, because it is the single
most important determinant of a nation's standard of living.
A productivity standard... unites the perspectives of consumers, workers, and companies. It embodies a positive
sum rather than a zero-sum view of competition. An approach to competition based on productivity growth will

16.

See MICHAEL E.

PORTER, COMPETITIVE

ADVANTAGE,

PORTER,

COMPETITIVE

(1985).
17.

See MICHAEL E.

PORTER,

CREATING

STRATEGY
&

(2d ed. 1998);

SUSTAINING SUPERIOR

MICHAEL

E.

PERFORMANCE

Strategic Interaction: Some Lessons From Industry Histories

for Theory and Antitrust Policy, in FTC,

STRATEGY, PREDATION, AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS

449-506 (Steven C. Salop ed., 1981).

18.

The book that explores this topic is MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE
OF NATIONS (1990), which intensively studies ten important trading

ADVANTAGE

nations.
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lead to outcomes that benefit consumers far more than a
shortsighted concern with static profitability." 9
[With this standard,] [a]ll practices scrutinized in antitrust should be subjected to the following question: how
20
will they affect productivity in growth?
So far, so good. I do not intend to go into what this might
mean in practice. Like Summers (and other commentators), I am
not convinced that the "Five Forces Analysis" or the "Diamond
Framework" take us very far beyond the ways enforcement officials
already look at an industry when analyzing a merger. 2 ' But I want to
call attention to the major point in what Porter says. When he criticizes static profitability as being of little advantage to consumers
compared to productivity growth, he is saying in an important and
clarion way that neo-classical economics misses the boat. The efficiency that the Chicago School values so highly is merely static,
whereas more and more emphasis is being placed in the business
schools, as symbolized by the work of Michael Porter, on the dynamic efficiencies that characterize a vibrant, innovative economy.
Porter and his business school colleagues are telling us, rightly
I believe, that it should be among the foremost tasks of antitrust to
22
spin out and evaluate the implications of a productivity paradigm.
No one is sure what that would mean, but it would surely force us to
focus more on behavior within the firm. A productivity paradigm
would encourage the kind of competition that inspires innovation.
19. Michael E. Porter, Competition & Antitrust: Toward A Productivity-BasedApproach
to Evaluating Mergers and Joint Ventures 146 (Jan. 11, 2001), at http://www.abanet.org/
ftp/fundamen taltheory.pdf.
20. Id. at 143.
21. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Should ConcentrationBe Dropped
From the Merger Guidelines? 351 (Jan. 11, 2001), at http://www.abanet.org/ftp/fundamentaltheory.pdf.: "All the economic forces addressed in Professor Porter's typology
are also addressed through the Merger Guidelines - not surprisingly given that Professor Porter's work and the Guidelines both draw on the same body of industrial organization theory."
22.
The Schumpeterian tradition of emphasizing innovation is not new. See, e.g.,
BURTON KLEIN, DYNAMIC ECONOMICS (1977). Nor would it be accurate to suggest that
innovation is ignored in today's antitrust analysis, as manifested in the theory of the
Microsoft case or the literature on innovation markets. As a generalization, antitrust
today recognizes innovation (or dynamic efficiency) as a desired outcome of antitrust
policy but not a principal driving force setting antitrust policy.
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Today's antitrust, by contrast, is aimed at keeping prices close to
cost.
I do not read Porter as saying we should replace or minimize
the microeconomic goal of competitive prices. Rather, antitrust
would have to more explicitly incorporate multiple goals, dynamic
efficiency as well as short-term efficiency. 23 The two are often, but
not necessarily, consistent. We have not yet developed a consensus-perhaps have not even begun to develop a consensus- for
reconciling the two forms of efficiency. Perhaps a lesson to be taken
from Porter (though not specifically offered by him) is that dynamic analysis should be made alongside microeconomic analysis,
and should trump it in the event of inconsistent outcomes. This
would be a significant directional adjustment, but saying it is not
the same thing as doing it.
Perhaps some of us were overwrought when we thought that
the Antitrust Law Section's Task Force on Fundamental Theory was
initially conceived with a laissez faire attitude that was intended to
undercut the availability of antitrust remedies against big business.
As it turned out, the Report took no positions but raised important
questions that could eventually lead to a new paradigm of analysis.
Thinking in terms of Kuhn's famous essay on scientific revolutions, 24 I believe we are at a point where the old paradigm of antitrust is increasingly recognized as inadequate, but the successor
paradigm has not yet been brought into focus. At this point, it is
even premature to say whether a new paradigm would favor plaintiffs or defendants or particular categories of industry. It is also premature to identify the interest groups that will support or oppose
evolution to a new paradigm. The idea that everyone will fall in
behind Porter's embrace of productivity simply because he says it
will represent the general good is dubious. Groups of political actors, starting with the academics and professionals who have the
greatest expertise, will have to see it as in their interest and will have
to develop the enabling machinery (first the academic literature,
later the political support). In short, we are still in the phase of
23. This conversation is also not intended to exclude distributional equity goals of
antitrust, but I've seen no evidence that the business schools have anything to add to
that enduring debate. See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency InterpretationChallenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982).
24. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996).
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recognition that the existing paradigm is badly flawed, with a difficult journey ahead.
The journey we envision might be no more than a systematic
incorporation of "dynamic antitrust analysis." This is an intriguing
term that has two meanings. One captures the sense that antitrust
analysis itself changes over time, as our state of political-economic
knowledge and the felt needs of the time continually change. The
second meaning is the more elusive, the mandate to find new ways
to use antitrust as a key to a more dynamic economy. In working
our way toward a new, more dynamic paradigm, the business
schools can be a logical and fertile source of information and ideas.
In the following sections, I turn to a few of the many questions inherent in working through an enhanced role for dynamic analysis.

THE ROLE OF

HuMAN

BEINGS IN DYNAMIc ANALYSIS

The model citizen in the world of neoclassical antitrust is
Homo Economicus, a mechanical grotesque who always acts rationally and with full information, to maximize profit. He is recognized
as an abstraction, but supposedly a useful one. Perhaps Homo
Economicus ascended the antitrust throne in the 1986 Supreme
Court case of Matsushita v. Zenith.25 Matsushita upheld the Chicago
School's view of predatory pricing, that because predatory pricing
has been declared by neoclassical economists to be an essentially
irrational strategy, it must occur, if at all, so rarely that when antitrust goes after predatory pricing, it is more likely to chill aggressive
price competition than to serve a valid consumer welfare purpose.
Consequently, the Chicago School says, predatory pricing complaints should be killed off whenever possible at the summary judgment stage of an antitrust case and should be next to impossible to
take to the jury (which might act less rationally than Chicago-inspired judges). Since Matsushita,it has been very common for predation cases to be dismissed on the strictly theoretical basis that it
would not be rational for the defendant to predate. As Eugene
Crew has said, Matsushita "reverses the traditional inductive process

25.

475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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by which juries have always been instructed to proceed-from em26
pirical data to ultimate fact."
In the recently revised edition of his influential Chicago
School essay, Antitrust Law, Judge Richard A. Posner looks back on
the time since his initial publication in 1976 and now declares unilateral victory. "Almost everyone professionally involved in antitrust
today," he writes,
-whether as litigator, prosecutor, judge, academic, or informed observer-not only agrees that the only goal of

the antitrust laws should be to promote economic welfare,
but also agrees on the essential tenets of economic theory

that should be used to determine the consistency of specific business practices with that goal. Agrees, that is, that
economic welfare should be understood in terms of the
economist's concept of efficiency; that business firms
should be assumed to be rational profit maximizers, so

that the issue in evaluating the antitrust significance of a
particular business practice should be whether it is a

means by which a rational profit maximizer can increase
its profits at the expense of efficiency ...

27

It is a shame that the Supreme Court did not attend to an article by Harry S. Gerla, a law professor, the year before Matsushita.28
Professor Gerla studied the role of psychology in predatory pricing.
He observed,
Scholars who seek to explain predatory pricing in terms
of rational profit-maximization ignore two very important
facts: (1) firms, as entities, cannot act on their own; and
(2) any actions by firms are, therefore, actions by the
human beings who manage the firms. Given these facts,
the answer to whether firms will engage in predatory pricing should not necessarily be sought in the realm of economic theory, but may more appropriately be sought
29
through the insights of experimental psychology.
26.
TrrRUST

27.
28.
Sw. L.J.
29.

Eugene Crew, The Chicago School Teaches the Supreme Court a Dubious Lesson, AN11, 12 (1986). Crew insists on the need to understand motive.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST Lx.w IX (2d ed. 2001).
Harry S. Gerla, The Psychology of Predatory Pricing: Why PredatoryPricingPays, 39
755, 755-80 (1985).
Id. at 756
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Gerla found in the psychological literature the well-documented generalization that people tend to be risk averse with respect to gains, but risk affinitive with respect to losses. Whether a
person looks at a situation as involving a gain or a loss can determine whether he is risk averse or risk affinitive. Gerla also found
that people tend to overweight and overestimate small probabilities
and to underweight and underestimate large ones. Applying these
well-established extra-economics insights, Gerla concluded that
even if a strategy of predatory pricing involves objectively small
chances for success, managers deciding whether to implement such
a strategy may view the chances of success as much higher than they
really are. The rational man assumption, it seems, may mislead us
into miscalculating how businesses in fact behave.
Gerla looks at how psychology might be applied in several typical antitrust situations, e.g. when a dominant firm attempts to maintain dominance against an interloper who is already causing losses,
or when a firm attempts to establish initial dominance. He also examines the putative victim's perspective. He shows, for example,
how psychological studies can be read to suggest that investors are
less likely to invest in a smaller company that is considering market
entry against a dominant company that has demonstrated a propensity for predatory behavior. Why engage in a high-risk strategy involving a potentially high return when you can alternatively invest
in the firm's current field or in a closely related field, involving a
low risk of loss? As Gerla concludes,
Most importantly, the psychology of risk taking suggests
that one cannot categorically deny the existence of predatory pricing, on either the basis that to engage in the
practice is irrational or the basis that even if a firm engages in predatory pricing, new entry will render the
30
firm's efforts nugatory.
Antitrust, under the spell of neoclassical economics, has become unrealistic because of certain assumptions, starting with the
rational, profit-maximizing man. 3 ' As Bolton, Brodley, and Riordan
say in their masterful article on predatory pricing and strategy, "A
30. Id. at 772.
31.
It is interesting to note that much of the work on behavioral economics has
originated at the University of Chicago, under Richard Thaler. Cass Sunstein, a law
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powerful tension has arisen between the foundations of current legal policy and modern economic theory. The courts adhere to a
static, non-strategic view of predatory pricing, believing this view to
be an economic consensus. This consensus, however, is one most
economists no longer accept."3 2 Obviously, when we speak of economists, we must avoid the common assumption that all economists
bow to the Chicago School, the particular wing of economics that
currently dominates antitrust. Contrarian economists are not the
only ones who are trying to understand the strategic aspects of firm
behavior. Through their familiarity with the psychology of human
behavior in certain roles, especially the roles of consumer and as
manager, the business schools should be able to help antitrust policy gain a more realistic sense of how firms are likely to behave in
competitive context.
While a variety of scholars have become interested in applying
psychological learning to economic situations, I had to search for
over a year to find one student of behavioral economics who is paying special attention to antitrust, finally identifying Professor Avishalom Tor, a Fellow at the Harvard Law School's Olin Center for
Law, Economics, and Business. Tor has written a lengthy article, The
3Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal Policy,
that applies behavioral economics to the analysis of competition
among new entrants into industry. Studying data relating to entry,
Tor finds, "The rationality assumption - that entrants will make
only positive, risk-adjusted net present value entry attempts-is difficult to reconcile with the empirical data."3 4 Unlike traditional theories of entry, says Tor,
a behavioral approach does not expect entrants to make
decisions under uncertainty according to norms of strict
rationality. Instead, it understands the entrants are
boundedly rational: They may weigh the pros and cons of
entry, but their ability to do so rationally is impeded by
professor at Chicago, gives substantial weight to this work in his book, FREE MARKETS
AND SOCIALJ'sTICE (1997). Perhaps my alma mater can be redeemed.
32. Patrick Bolton,Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, PredatoryPricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2242 (2000).
33. Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Enty Bounded Rationality and the Efficacy of Competi-

tion, 101 Mic'-i. L. REV. 482 (2002).
34.

Id. at 498.
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the limitations of human cognition and affected by motivation and emotion. To utilize their limited mental resources most effectively, entrants therefore employ
simplifying decision heuristics that enable them to function reasonably well in a complex environment, but also
35
lead them at times to systematic, predictable errors.
Tor's focus is quite different from Gerla's. Where Gerla honed
in on risk adversity and the misweighting of probabilities at the
high and low ends of the spectrum, causing implicitly rational entrants and their financiers to forego markets in which predation is
believed to occur, Tor is particularly interested in the tendency (attributable to bounded rationality) of market entrants to be overconfident of their chances for success. He marshals substantial
psychological and economic evidence revealing several puzzling
phenomena: e.g., while rational entry would be based on a calculation to maximize net present value, the empirical evidence shows
that entry in fact is pervasive, but there is a prevalence of negative
net present value; while rational entry should be proportional to its
anticipated profitability, factors that should lead to the expectation
of low profitability in fact seem not to inhibit entry; finally, startup
entries exhibit higher failure rates and an inferior average performance compared to diversifying entrants. 36 These "puzzles" reflect
the inconsistency between economic theory and empirical data
about entry.
Tor's discussion leads to several interesting comments on the
role of entry barriers in antitrust. He believes, for instance, that entry barriers do little to deter entry, except when industry is also concentrated. He finds that the fundamental hostility of antitrust law to
unnecessary restrictions on new business entry is well founded, and
that the more important question for antitrust is not initial entry
but survival. "Survival barriers", as he calls them, create impediments to new entrants' growth and survival. "Since a high rate of
entry may be accompanied by very limited market penetration, the
mere evidence of entry should not be sufficient to reject predatory
pricing claims out of hand. Instead, the courts should focus on the
success of entrants in penetrating the market as a better indication
35.
36.

Id. at 504-05.
Id. at 491-95.
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of the short-term competitive threat such entrants pose for allegedly predatory incumbents. '3 7 Tor also concludes that diversifying
entrants are more likely to have competitive significance in the
short term than start-up entrants and that the few surviving innovative entrants (who are often start-ups) may well have a greater longterm impact on the market, posing a long-term threat to powerful
incumbents, such that an incumbent stands to gain a larger possibility of recoupment in deterring innovative entrants than the traditional approach seems to recognize.
Tor's analysis, like Porter's, gives great weight to innovation.
He argues that bounded rationality that leads to a high rate of entry
is good for society because it increases the potential for innovation
and meaningful competition against incumbents. His approach, in
other words, demonstrates that a behavioral analysis has the potential of assisting in the development of a more dynamic antitrust
paradigm.
In reaching his conclusions, Tor often speaks about predictions and the factors that account for systematically biased predictions by individual decision makers. We now turn to this topic as
another area in which business school professors might contribute
to antitrust.
THE ROLE OF PREDICTION

Antitrust is permeated by predictions and forecasts. Would a
firm enter a market if prices in the market increased by 5%? How
long would it take for a firm to enter a market? Will a merger result
in efficiencies? Let's be more specific. Will a merger between
United Airlines and US Airways cause additional airlines to merge
as a subsequent counter-strategy?' 8 Will the government's proposed
settlement keep Microsoft from using its operating system monopoly to stifle innovation it deems not in its interest? Will GE's inhouse financing abilities be so advantageous to Honeywell that
competitors of the combined company will not be able to obtain
adequate financing and will wither? The very language of the Clay37. Id. at 553.
38. See Albert A. Foer, Testimony Concerning Airline Mergers Before the Senate
Commerce, Transportation and Science CommitteeJune 22, 2000, available at http://
www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent/74.cfm.
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ton Act's merger provision refers to predictions: mergers are illegal
if they "may" substantially lessen competition.
Today's American antitrust law enforcers tend to be wary of
prediction. In a recent speech to an international audience, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General William Kolasky offered guiding concepts for merger policy:
....

[A] ntitrust officials, like doctors, should take a sort of

Hippocratic oath: before intervening, we should be confident that our actions will not cause harm. Antitrust authorities should be law enforcers, not industrial policy
makers who try to move industries in a certain direction
or dictate particular market results. Dictating industrial
policy is not the proper role of an antitrust authority for a
very good reason: the long-term (and in some industries,
even the short-term) predictive powers of antitrust enforcers are limited. Over the course of my twenty-five year career as an antitrust lawyer, I continually have been
amazed at how markets evolve-often in ways that even
the most sophisticated of industry participants were unable to anticipate.
In the United States [as compared to Europe], we
have relatively little confidence in our ability to make predictions far out into the future and have much more faith
in the self-correcting nature of markets. These beliefs
lead us to be skeptical of self-interested claims by rivals
that a merger will lead to their ultimate demise and explain why we demand strong factual and empirical proof
before we accept such claims.3 9
Implicit in Kolasky's remarks is the possibility that different antitrust regimes may reflect, to some degree, different levels of confidence in their ability to make predictions. It is also possible that
people in different roles would have different attitudes toward prediction. During the ABA roundtable on fundamental antitrust theory last summer, the head of a litigating section of the Antitrust
Division observed:
39. Deputy Assistant Attorney General William J. Kolasky, Comparative Merger
Control Analysis: Six Guiding Principles for Antitrust Agencies-New and Old, Cape
Town, South Africa, Address Before an International Audience (Mar. 18, 2002), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/l0845.htm.
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We typically, when reviewing company documents, find
out that the people who are involved in those companies
on a day-to-day basis, in marketing and sales and development, are wrong as much as they are right about what the
future is going to look like in that industry. And, as the
time frame goes out, as enforcers, and I'm the head of a
merger unit at the Antitrust Division, one's confidence as
to the results that one is talking about becomes lower and
40
lower. 1
As exemplified by these and similar remarks, law enforcers
rightly want to avoid making decisions based on speculation about
the future. 4 1 On the other hand, doing nothing also reflects a vision
of what the future will hold. 42 It, too, incorporates a prediction, and

there is no point in assuming superior objectivity for the predictions of a management team that will reap major personal economic advantages (and may be biased for psychological reasons as
well) when they help execute a merger. 43 If there are methods of
forecasting that could provide more confidence about the predictions both of merger consequences and of law enforcers' predictions, these could be useful tools for antitrust analysis. At the same
time, if there are inherent limitations on prediction that can be
better understood, this could have an impact on the credibility to
be given to various arguments, e.g. that efficiency gains of a merger
40. Robert Kramer, Address at the ABA Roundtable on Fundamental Antitrust
Theory (July 2001), in ABA Report of the Task Force on Fundamental Theory 400-01
(July 2001).
41. 1 have some sympathy with this. I served as a Commissioner on the National
Electronic Funds Transfer Commission in the 1970's. As a presidential study commission, we spent two years listening to every conceivable person with knowledge about the
emerging EFT industry. But we entirely missed the reality that two years after publishing our report, people would be conducting banking from their homes by personal
computer.

42. Therefore, prediction cannot be eliminated. "The power of prediction must
be prudently exercised, not exorcised. We are fooling ourselves if we think we can run a
competitive economy based solely on microeconomic analysis of existing markets. The
challenge presented by the apparent rapid concentration of both petroleum and longdistance telephony is for the antitrust community to develop the tools for more reliable
predictions about an industry's future - and to have the courage to act on the basis of
forward vision." Albert A. Foer, The Future and Antitrust, FTC:WATCH No. 530 (Oct. 1],
1999), available at http://wwv.antitrustinstitute.org/recent/43.cfm.
43. SeeJames A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationality in Action: A Study Of Psychological Factorsin
Merger Decision-Making,62 Oito ST. L.J. 1333 (2001).
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will be great or that a particular remedy will work in such and such
a way, which are frequently heard in antitrust cases.
In fact, Professor Scott Armstrong of the Wharton School's
marketing department told me recently, 44 while there is a lot of
"planning" in corporate America, there seems to be very little systematic forecasting in corporations or in government." What planning he and others have observed in corporations was often done
poorly. 45 Yet standards have been established that can serve as a
basis for better planning and predicting. Indeed, there is some evidence that mergers that were subjected to formal planning and
4
forecasting do better than other mergers.

This is a hugely important insight, if correct, because an indisputably high proportion of mergers do not turn out very well. After
reviewing the economic literature on whether mergers are value enhancing, industrial organization economist F.M. Scherer
concluded,
What the combination of this evidence seems to reveal is
that making mergers is a risky proposition. Many mergers,
and perhaps the majority, fail to live up to expectations
and may indeed make matters worse rather than better.
Many muddle through. A fair number succeed, and a few
succeed spectacularly.. .Making mergers is a form of gain44. Interview with Scott Armstrong, Marketing Professor, Wharton School of Business (Apr. 2, 2002).
45. E.g., in the ABA roundtable on fundamental theory, Connie Robinson, an experienced Antitrust Division executive said, "You would be surprised, if you were a law
enforcer, at the number of companies who don't have a clearly articulatable reason for
merger"- Professor Michael Porter of the Harvard Business School interrupted, "No, I
wouldn't be surprised," ABA Report of the Task Force on Fundamental Theory 402
(July 2001). Later, Professor Porter says, "And so I think that there's just a lot of bad
strategic thinking in companies. You know, people believe that a merger equals a strategy. Well, a merger isn't a strategy; a merger is a tool for strategy." i .at 405. Porter
states, "In my view, if mergers fell by half in America, that wouldn't bother me a bit. I
wouldn't shed a tear. I wouldn't be sad. I mean, the investment bankers would be horrified, but I wouldn't shed a tear, because, from my collective experience, most of them
don't work." Id. at 402.
46. See Scott Armstrong, The Value of FormalPlanningfor Strategic Decisions: Review of
the EmpiricalResearch, 3 STRArEGIC MGMTJ. 197, 197-211 (1982), availableat http://wwwmarketing.wharton.upenn.edu/ideas/pdf/valueofformalplanning.pdf; see also H. Igor
Ansoff et al., Does Planning Pay? The Effect of Planning on the Success of Acquisitions in
American Firms, 3 J. Soc'v LONG RANGE PLANNING 2, 2-7 (Dec. 1970).
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bling; skill matters, but there is an important chance
47
component.
Failed mergers are disruptive to individual lives and costly to
society. The very fact that a high proportion of mergers fail may be
an indication that the current paradigm, assuming rational profit
maximizing, is flawed. If more formalized planning and forecasting
within firms can yield better results, it would be in the public interest to encourage this. If better methodologies for prediction were
capable of being used by the enforcement agencies, it is possible
that the level of confidence in prediction would increase and that
more aggressive intervention would be justified. If, on the other
hand, the corporate planning process has built into it methodological and psychological flaws that tend to create an optimistic bias,
then not only should antitrust analysis discount for such bias, but
perhaps Congress should consider placing additional barriers in
the way of large mergers.
What can the business schools offer? The matter of prediction
is a subject that is taken up in the business schools because of its
centrality to strategic planning and marketing. Forecasting assists in
developing estimates about the future. Forecasting is concerned
with what the future will look like, while planning is concerned with
what it should look like. The strategic management process usually
starts with planning. This activity produces a plan that is an input to
the forecasting process (along with information about the environment) to create a forecast. Corporate strategic planning has long
utilized forecasting, not merely for economic forecasts, but also to
predict technological changes, changing social attitudes, and even
potential changes in federal, state, and local regulations. 48 Philip
Kotler says in the chapter of Marketing Management that is titled
"Measuring and Forecasting Market Demand,"
Companies commonly use a three-stage procedure to prepare a sales forecast. They make an environmentalforecast,
followed by an industry forecast, followed by a company sales
forecast.. .All forecasts are built on one of three informa47. F.M. Scherer, Some Principlesfor Post-ChicagoAntitrust Analysis, 52 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1, 18 (2001). This paper was originally presented to the AAI National Conference in 2001.
48. GEORGE A. STEINER, STRATEGIC PLANNING 140 (1979).
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tion bases: what people say, what people do, or what people
49
have done.

Because businesses and governments need good forecasts (and
will pay for them), a discipline has grown up to provide this service.
Large firms have planning departments that develop various forecasts. Smaller firms can buy forecasts from several types of suppliers, such as marketing research firms, specialized forecasting firms,
and futures research firms. A key question is whether methodologies have been developed for business use that can feasibly be applied to antitrust questions.
Professor Armstrong suggests that three methodologies used
by forecasters and taught in business schools are most likely to be
relevant to antitrust: (1) systematic use of experts, (2) role playing,
50
and (3) analogies. There may be others, such as simulations.
Reasoning by analogy is familiar to lawyers, who are used to
arguing whether a prior case is "on all fours" with some current
situation. Economists, too, use analogies in arriving at predictions.
It is not clear that forecasting would introduce anything new into
the process, but Armstrong suggests that a more systematic approach in the use of analogies could be helpful.
Role-playing can be very effective in some situations and one
could imagine its use in a merger analysis. For example, a group
could be asked to role-play the reactions of various members of an
industry in response to the merger of two leading competitors. Selecting the role players and formulating the game in a way that it
could produce evidence for a case would not be easy, but at the
least, role playing could help a prosecutor or defense attorney develop a mode of thinking about, e.g., an appropriate remedy. Armstrong has found that role-playing often provides results that are
5
superior to other approaches. '

49. PHILIP KOTLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT 251 (7th ed. 1991).
50. See Tor, supra note 33 (contains many references to simulation experiments
relevant to economic situations).
See Simon London, Games or Serious Business?, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2002; see also
51.
Kesten C. Green, ForecastingDecisions in Conflict Situations:A Comparison of Game Theory,
Role Playing, and UnaidedJudgment (Apr. 2002), at http://fourps.wharton.upenn.edu/
forecast/paperpdf/Greenforecastinginconflict.pdf.
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Forecasting may have the most to offer in its systematic use of
experts.5 2 Kotler notes,
Occasionally companies will assemble an invited group of
experts to make a particular forecast. The experts exchange views and produce a group estimate (group discussion methods). Or they supply their estimates individually,
and the analyst combines them in a single estimate (pooling of individual estimates). Or they supply individual estimates and assumptions that are reviewed by a company
analyst, revised, and followed by further rounds of esti5
mating (Delphi method). 3
The Delphi method, to take a promising example, has proven
54
to be a technique that improves predictions by a group of experts.
In the mid-1970s, the FTC's Bureau of Competition contracted for
a study of the motivations driving conglomerate mergers. 55 The
study was conducted by a futures researcher using a modified Delphi method for iterative interviewing of highly regarded experts,
including corporate executives, investment bankers, and M&A attorneys. The results, not intended to be predictive but rather to
enlighten with respect to a current phenomenon, were interesting:
they converged on motivations that had little to do with efficiencies
or even profit-maximizing. Soon thereafter, however, the Chicago
School built its assumptions of efficiency and profit-maximizing
into the basis of antitrust analysis.
A question for us is whether the Delphi or similar methods can
be utilized in investigations or litigation, by plaintiffs or defendants,
to produce a new and better form of expert testimony. Obviously,
there are difficult questions about how to establish a panel of experts that is both sufficiently expert and sufficiently unbiased so
52.

SeeJ. Larreche & Reza Moinpour, ManagerialJudgment in Marketing: The Concept

of Expertise, 20J. OF MARKETING RES. 110-21 (May 1983).
53. KOTLER, supra note 49, at 254.
54.

See, e.g., Gene Rowe & George Wright, The Delphi Technique as a ForecastingTool:
INT'LJ. OF FORECASTING 353 (1999), at http://fourps.wharton.
upenn.edu/forecast/paperpdf/delphi%20technique%20Rowe%20Wright.pdf;
Jolson
& Rossow, The Delphi Process in Marketing Decision Making, 8 J. OF MARKETING REs. 443
(Nov. 1971); Roger J. Best, An Experiment in Delphi Estimation in MarketingDecision Making, IIJ. OF MARKETING RES. 447 (Nov. 1974).
55. The author was Wayne Boucher and I was the contracting officer at the FTC. I
cannot locate any extant copies of the report.
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that the results would be persuasive. At what point(s) in the process
would this type of input be workable? Could a report on the consensus of a group of recognized experts pass the Daubert test for
expert witnesses?
The above discussion suggests several additional research
projects for marketing and strategic management professionals that
could be useful to the development of antitrust policy.
Update the 1970 Ansoff research 5 6 on the extent to
which systematic planning and forecasting affect the
success of a merger. If they are associated with success, then planning and forecasting in accordance
with the best practices could be encouraged or even
perhaps mandated within the merger process.
2. Develop a standard for planning and forecasting that
could be utilized within a premerger notification or
merger analysis program. Are there ways in which enforcers can better evaluate the planning documents
that they scrutinize?
3. Apply various forecasting protocols to actual mergers,
comparing the predictions of independent experts
both with the predictions of law enforcement officials
and with the eventual actual results.
4. Experiment with role-playing to make predictions
about entry into a market. Compare such predictions
with the predictions of law enforcement officials and
with the actual eventual results. Entry predictions are
needed in market definition and in analysis of the
role of potential competition.
5. Utilize forecasting techniques to predict how consumers will react to a 5% price increase of a particular
product. This prediction arises in the process of defining a market.
6. Investigate whether there is an optimistic bias that
normally afflicts longer-term corporate forecasts and
even year-to-year predictions, and if so, explain the
causes.
1.

56.

See Fanto, supra note 43.
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BUSINESS UNDERSTANDING AND VERTICAL RELATIONSHIPS

In the Michael Porter vision of competition, two of the five
forces are bargaining power of the buyer and bargaining power of
the supplier. In other words, the exercise of power in vertical relationships is crucial to the dynamics of an industry. Chicago School
economics, on the other hand, tends to see vertical relations as a
form of intercourse between consenting adults best to be ignored
for the most part by government. 5 7 There are two areas I want to
suggest where a business school perspective can be particularly beneficial. The first relates in general to the nature of competition that
exists between buyer and supplier and the second to the special
case of monopsonistic power.
Let us focus on consumer goods, which is a topic of major interest to the business schools. I will be drawing heavily on the oeuvre of Robert L. Steiner, a business consultant, former FTC
economist, former business school teacher, and former CEO of a
large toy manufacturing company. The neoclassical assumption is
that the retail and wholesale markets that intervene between manufacturers and household consumers can be ignored because distribution firms buy and sell as perfect competitors. In this "singlestage" model, these markets are assumed to be analytically neutral. 58 Steiner has spent the past thirty years developing and articulating an informal "dual-stage" model that is intended more
accurately to reflect the relationships between firms at different
stages. 59 His critically important observation is that manufacturers
57. Judge Posner separates himself from those economists who believe it is virtually impossible for a firm or group of firms ever to exclude competitors or potential
competitors from the market, other than by buying them out or paying them off in
some other fashion, unless they have lower costs or obtain the aid of the government.
In his latest take (which he says does not represent a change of mind), he says, "Although documented cases of genuinely exclusionary practices are rare, they do exist,
and economic theory points to conditions occasionally encountered in which they are a
rational profit-maximizing tactic." RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw 194 (2d ed.

2001).
58.
See Robert L. Steiner, The Inverse Association Between the Marginsof Manufacturers
and Retailers, 8 Rev. of Industrial Organization No. 6 (1993).
59.
Steiner's most important articles include: Marketing Productivity in Consumer
Goods Industries-A Vertical Perspective, 42 J. OF MARKETING, No. 1 (1978); Robert L.
Steiner, How ManufacturersDeal with the Price-cuttingRetailer: ien Are Vertical Restraints
Efficient? 65 ANTITRUST L.J. No. 2 407 (1997); Robert L. Steiner, The Third Relevant Market, 45 ANTITRUST BULL. 719 (2000).
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and retailers recognize that there is both a competitive and complementary dimension to their relationship. 60 The "vertical competition" between them - ignored by antitrust law and economics-is
over their respective share of a brand's consumer price. When a
brand's consumer franchise is strengthened, through advertising or
otherwise, its retail gross margin falls and the manufacturer has
captured vertical share from his retailers. This enables the manufacturer to sell more units at the same factory price. The additional
dollar he has taken from his retailers by depressing their gross margins, says Steiner, is just as good as the horizontal dollar he takes
from rival producers when consumers begin to buy his brand instead of theirs. To overlook this type of competition is to place theory above reality.
The business schools, with their focus on distribution channels,
ought to be able to evaluate Steiner's analysis and help the antitrust
enforcers take a more realistic approach to the power aspects of
vertical competition. What are some of the implications of Steiner's
perspective?
First, it is important to know whether the inverse association
between margins at the two stages holds in a given case or whether
margins might be positively related. In the former instance, a 5%
increase in factory prices from a merger might mean retail prices
rose only by, e.g., 3%, or actually fell. In the latter case, a 3% rise in
factory prices could be associated with a larger rise in retail prices.
The Merger Guidelines do not deal with this point, and instead tell
the agencies in the case of a proposed merger among manufacturers to measure prices at that level instead of at the retail level. 6'
Second, the economics literature on what happens when a factor cost increases does not give adequate treatment to the question
of pass throughs. For example, the analysts are now making increased use of scanning data in retail stores, but no one seems to
know how to link the changes in retail prices from the scanner data
with associated changes in manufacturers' prices. Another example
occurs in indirect purchaser cases where it is usually assumed by
60. This is an observation that is essential to the theme of business school professors Adam M. Brandenburger and Barry J. Nalebuff. See ADAM M. BRANDENBURGER &
BARRYJ. NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION (1996).
61.
See Robert L. Steiner, The Third Relevant Market, 45 ANTITRUST BULL. 719
(2000).
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antitrust economists that the retailer passes on only 100 percent or
less of the upstream price increase to the consumer; but in fact
what the retailer passes on has often been increased by the retailer's
markup, because the retailer has to fight to maintain his gross margin on the product, and usually has enough ways to avoid competitive pressures (contrary to orthodox theory) to do this
successfully. 62 Whether this is theoretically and empirically accurate
was the subject of a debate between Steiner and two leading antitrust economists. 63 The business schools are well-situated to provide
enlightenment on the nature of vertical competition.
Third, the Merger Guidelines define the relevant antitrust market by reference to the 5% test, which deals with price changes
only. Yet, numerous articles in the marketing literature find that in
the great majority of categories, retailers' private labels have been
gaining market share from manufacturers' national brands principally by their control over shelf space and by quality competition
rather than by price competition. 64 The agencies, looking at a horizontal merger, often do not consider retailer private labels to be in
the same market as manufacturer national brands, on the basis of
the 5% test not being met; but the retailers' private labels seem to
be taking sales, market shares or margins from the manufacturers'
national brands, which implies they are competing in the same relevant market. Steiner argues that the agencies should incorporate
62. Competition should not prevent retailers from passing through to consumers
any increases in their costs. The question is whether they pass through more than the
invoice cost increases. If the pre-price increase retail gross margin is 50%, a $1 increase
in factory price must become a $2 increase in consumer price, if gross margins are to
remain constant. When gross margins slip, bankers and investors as well as top managers begin to worry.
63. Jeremy Bulow &Jonathan Baker, Reply to SteinerF'TC:Watch Editorial,Debate at
the American Antitrust Institute (Dec. 20, 1999), at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/
recent/48.cfm. The debate focused on an FTC study of the increase in the price of
cigarettes caused by the tobacco manufacturers' settlement with the states. Id. Steiner
has subsequently shown that the percentage industry gross distribution margin remained unchanged after the increase, demonstrating that more than the dollar factory
price increases were passed through to consumers. See Steiner, supra note 61.
64. Robert L. Steiner, The Nature and Benefits of NationalBrand/PrivateLabel Competition (Jan. 5, 2002) (unpublished working paper presented at the Annual Meeting of
the American Economic Association, Atlanta, Ga.), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/174.cfm. Steven J. Hoch et al., Why the PrivateLabel is One of the Few
Brands to Show Consistent Long Term Growth (Aug. 2001) (unpublished manuscript
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Ass'n., Atlanta, Ga.).
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the criterion of whether the firms are competitors in his sense
rather than rely solely on the test of whether the merged firm can

sustain a 5% price increase against firms at the same level. If
Steiner's insights are correct, antitrust would be forced to look at
vertical as well as horizontal competition and at non-price as well as
price competition. The business schools can help us understand if
this will produce a more realistic definition of the relevant antitrust

market.
Much of the pass through debate that was alluded to revolves
around whether retailers face competition that would keep them

from passing through to consumers more than an increase in the
factory price. In recent years, retailing has changed dramatically,
with concentration levels taking an upward leap and firms that are
dominant in multiple product markets exercising new forms of buying power. The food industry provides many instances of inordinate
buyer power, as retailer control of shelf-space has created the ability
to insist on slotting allowances and other manifestations of payment
by manufacturers. 6 5 Manufacturers have attempted to regain lost
power through mergers and the development of the institution of

category captain, which appears to give a highly questionable degree of influence to the leading supplier in a category of products,
but may also be a mechanism for price coordination between the
two stages of distribution. 66 Monopsonistic issues have begun to appear in a few antitrust cases, 67 but there is currently relatively little
65.
See, e.g., Hearings on Slotting Fees in the Grocery Industry Before the Senate
Committee on Small Business, 106th Cong. (1999) (testimony of Robert Skitol, Attorney at Law, Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.
org/recent/39.cfm.
66. See Albert A. Foer, The Category Captain and the ConsolidatingFood Industry,
FTC: WATCH No. 566, at 8 (May 20, 2001 ) (Wash. Regulatory Reporting Ass'n, Washington, D.C.), available at http://vwwv.antitrustinstitute.org/recent/119.cfm. The first appearance of the category captain issue in the antitnist literature was Robert L. Steiner,
Category Management-A Pervasive, New Vertical/HorizontalFormat, 15 ANi-ITRUST No. 2, at
77-81, available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent/115.cfm.
67. In 1999 the Department of Justice challenged two recent mergers in the
health care and agricultural industries that posed monopsony concerns. See Marius
Schwartz, Buyer Power Concerns and the Aetna-Prudential Merger, Address at the
Northwestern University School of Law Fifth Annual Health Care Antitrust Forum (Oct.
20, 1999), http://wvw.antitrustinstitute.org/recent/115.cfinPrudential
Merger
(describing United States v. Aetna, Civ. No. 99-1398 (D.D.C. filed June 21, 1999), and
United States v. Cargill, Civ. No. 99-1875 (D.D.C.filedJuly 8, 1999)), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/3924.htm. See also United States v. Rice Growers
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empirical knowledge in the antitrust community concerning the
power relationships that have come into existence between the new
dominant retailer (or small group of dominant retailers) and the
manufacturer level. Although there is much we need to learn, it
appears that manufacturers are responding to retailer mergers by
their own mergers, so that concentration is increasing at both levels
in many categories, and that the exercise of countervailing power
by manufacturers will enfeeble vertical competition. 68 This may be
facilitated by category management techniques that increase margins at both levels and thereby raise retail prices. The business
schools, again, could make a substantial contribution to antitrust
understanding in this increasing important area.
BUSINESS ETHICS AND ANTITRUST

The final topic I would like to raise is the relationship between
business ethics and antitrust. As I stated earlier, it appears that to
the extent that business schools have ethics courses, such courses
do not systematically take up questions of responsibilities that one
firm may have toward another, apart from the basic injunction
against breaking the law. Business leaders, however, act in an ethical capacity in a great many of their decisions. A manager does not
have to believe that a competitor is a stakeholder in the same sense
as a shareholder or a labor force, to whom some moral-type obligations are owed. Nonetheless, to think about antitrust only as a matter of "don't break the law" is an inadequate basis for corporate
leadership.
It can be argued that antitrust has nothing to do with ethics,
that it is strictly about conforming behavior to legal norms. Such an
argument would be enhanced by pointing to the way in which Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act has been de-ethicized
in the past twenty or so years. What are "unfair methods of competiAss'n of Cal., Civ., No. 84-1066
67,288, at 61,466 (1986) (prohibiting merger that
would have substantially lessened competition in the market for purchasing locally
grown rice); Robert A. Skitol, Short Leap from Toys-R-Us to Heinz-Beechnut, FTC: WATCH
No. 550 (Sept. 11, 2000) (Wash. Regulatory Reporting Ass'n, Washington, D.C.), availabe at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent/88.cfm.
68.

Albert A. Foer, Baked Lasagne, in A FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PoLICY FOR THE

21ST CENTURY (Michael Stumo ed. 2000), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/
recent/79.cfm.
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tion"? And what is "fairness" if not an essentially ethical concept?
Nonetheless, under the leadership of neoclassical economics, the
content of Section 5 has come to be seen as identical to the other
antitrust laws, tied to whether particular actions reduce consumer
welfare. And yet, still, it is hard to put ethical considerations aside.
In the popular mind, antitrust is largely about providing competitors the opportunity to prove themselves on a "level playing field"with the idea that business should be something more than a mere
jungle in which the strongest and nastiest always wins. Something
over nine-tenths of antitrust cases are brought by private plaintiffs
rather than by public enforcers. 69 Many of these cases will be
judged by a jury of people who believe in the level playing field
ideal, and others will be settled on the basis of predictions about
how such ajury would rule. From a strictly pragmatic viewpoint, the
fine distinctions of the neoclassical economist must, in practice, be
mellowed by a sense of what people are likely to think is fair and
just.
Many business decisions must be made in the presence of incomplete information, where all of the ramifications of a decision
cannot be known. This is a fundamental teaching of the business
schools. Among those decisional ramifications is the applicability of
the antitrust laws. Even within a consumer welfare context, it is not
clear how the variety of predictions alluded to earlier that are at the
heart of antitrust analysis will come out in a particular case. This is
not merely a matter of the law being vague, but of the relevant facts
being to some important extent unknown at the time the business
decision is being made. Certainly, business students can be taught
to think systematically and prudentially about the probabilities of
whether a proposed course of action will bring down the antitrust
laws on them at a later date (or at least, they can be sensitized to the
kind of situations that will require them to consult an antitrust lawyer), but they can also be taught to think within an ethical framework about such actions. What will they say in a deposition four
years after the decision and how will they feel about themselves
when the facts become public? Will they feel that they acted fairly as
69.
See, e.g., ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACiC, ANTITRUST LAW AND EcoNOMICS 462 (1994) ("During the 1980s, private filings fell substantially, and the ratio of
private to public cases stabilized at roughly 10 to 1").
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human beings or merely fulfilled a stereotypical role of an inordinately aggressive business person?
Antitrust provides many case studies that could be used in
teaching business ethics. Is it right for a monopolist to try to put a
competitor out of business? 70 Are there times when it is not right
for a supplier to terminate a distributor; or for a manager to discuss
prices with a friend in a competing business; or for a monopolist to
maximize prices; or for a company to suppress an innovation; or for
competitors to work together to keep a new entrant out of the market? These are questions of some difficulty and the answers don't
have to rely on an analysis of whether the actor will get prosecuted
or sued.
Antitrust cases, therefore, would likely make good candidates
for case studies in business ethics courses. Perhaps, if teachers of
business ethics were to gain experience in this type of classroom
discussion, they could feed their evolving understanding back into
the antitrust community in ways that would enrich the analysis provided by economists and lawyers.
CONCLUSION
The third leg of the antitrust stool, which is taught and
thought in the business schools, has not played its proper role in
the intellectual development of antitrust. I believe this observation
in itself is noteworthy, but business school learning will have to address itself more specifically to antitrust issues and be tested in the
laboratory of antitrust analysis. To the extent that business school
learning is different from what comes out of the law schools and
the economics departments, it could help the antitrust community
identify shortcomings and suggest corrective directions. If future
managers are indeed taught to behave in ways that are contrary to
what is predicted by prevailing antitrust theory, there is a disconnect that must be understood and repaired. On the other hand, to
the extent that law, economics, and business thinking can be integrated into a coherent interrelationship, the antitrust undertaking
will rest more solidly.
70.
For a review of one religion's traditional approach to the ethics of competition, see MEIR TAMARI, WITH ALL YOUR POSSESSIONS, JEWISH ETHICS AND ECONOMIC LIFE,
ch. 5 (1987).

